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Abstract
There is a consensus that one of the most important ingredients
for high and sustainable growth is human capital accumulation. Yet,
a different strand of literature argues that there are some frictions in
the labor markets of most countries that result in possible education-
occupation mismatches, and consequently inefficiencies. Despite a sig-
nificant amount of research using data from advanced economies there
are very few studies on developing economies. Considering that human
capital is scarce in these countries, whether it is efficiently allocated is
arguably relatively more important. This paper using data from two
different years examines the incidence of overeducation in Turkey. The
findings show that there is a significant amount of over- and undere-
ducated workers, and they are paid significantly less than those with
the same level of education but working in jobs that require education
levels that match their own. The magnitude of the incidence and the
impact of mismatches on wages are, however, not too different than in
most developed economies.
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1 Introduction
It is an established fact, both theoretically and empirically, that human capital
accumulation is an essential ingredient for high levels of and sustainable growth
(Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). It is not surprising then for
most international organizations to advise and urge developing countries to
increase the educational attainment levels of their populations. Indeed, in the
last couple of decades the literacy rate has increased all around the world.
Many developing country governments allocated a significant amount of their
revenues to subsidize education.
Meanwhile, a different strand of literature, following the seminal paper
of Duncan and Hoffman (1981), draws attention to the incidence of overed-
ucation, that is, the share of individuals who work in jobs that require less
education than they have acquired. Groot and van den Brink (2000) using a
meta analysis based on available studies to date conclude that while the level
of overeducation depends on the measure used to estimate the incidence, the
‘true’ level of overeducation is around 23% in developed countries and that
there was no significant change between the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore,
they find that there is a substantial penalty on overeducation, that is, individ-
uals that have higher levels of education than the required level earn less than
their counterparts who have the same level of education but are working in
jobs that require their level of education. If the phenomenon of overeducation
is also present in developing countries, then the efficiency of resource allocation
to subsidize education becomes questionable. It may imply that the observed
gain in growth is less than the potential if the scarce and valuable resource
were, at least partially, allocated at other ends, for example, to improve the
quality of job matching.
Unfortunately, almost all studies on overeducation use data from advanced
economies, with the exception of Quinn and Rubb (2006) who investigate the
Mexican labor market. They find that a significant portion of Mexican males
are overeducated1, and the number of Mexican males that are overeducated
1Overeducation, as will be explained later, is measured in relative terms. Therefore, it
is possible for some workers to be overeducated even when the supply of skilled labor is
limited.
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exceeds the number that are undereducated. Moreover, their analysis indi-
cates that there is some increase in the incidence of overeducation from the
late 1980s to late 1990s. They also estimate the return to and additional year
of overeducation that is around half of the return to a year of required edu-
cation. Their estimates are close to the ones found in developed economies,
yet, given the limited resources in a developing country, the opportunity cost
of education-job mismatches is expected to be higher in Mexico.
Following their lead, this paper measures the incidence of overeducation
in another developing country, namely Turkey, and discusses its consequences
for productivity2. In the last twenty years Turkey has made a special effort
to increase the educational attainment level of her population. The literacy
rate increased from 82% in 1990 to 96% in 2010. During the same period
average years of schooling of the working age population increased from 5.3
years to 6.4 years in 2000 and, following the change in the mandatory education
law requiring a minimum of eight years of education instead of five in 1997,
average years of schooling reached 7.5 years in 2010. Earlier studies on the
relationship between education and wages in Turkey report very high private
returns for each additional degree, particularly on university degrees (Tunali,
2003; Duygan and Guner, 2006; Tansel and Bircan, 2010). Consequently,
every year around 1.5 million students are competing in a nationwide exam
to be allocated into one of 400 thousand available slots in the universities. A
significant number of those who are applying for the exam are spending large
sums of money and time for preparation. In recent years, the government,
overwhelmed by the sheer numbers, also increased the number of universities
most of which are publicly funded. The spending and effort put into education,
particularly to higher education, in Turkey, whether publicly or privately, is
not negligible.
The present study examines the incidence of mismatches and returns to
overeducation in Turkey, using data from 1994 and 2002 Household Budget and
Expenditure Surveys. On the one hand, it will extend the analysis by Quinn
and Rubb (2006) to another developing country and discuss whether their
results can be generalized; on the other hand, given the current government
2The study by Galasi (2008) on overeductaion in Europe also includes some observations
from Turkey.
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policies to expand university education and the allocation of both private and
public resources to acquire higher levels of education in Turkey it will serve for
a better understanding of the relationship between education and productivity.
2 Theoretical framework
There is a multitude of explanations for the existence of overeducation and
they are explained in detail elsewhere (e.g., McGuinness, 2006). Here, they
are briefly summarized with their relevance to a developing economy context.
The neoclassical model of human capital theory based on Becker (1964) as-
sumes that each worker is paid his or her marginal productivity which depends
on the level of human capital the person has accumulated over time. The em-
pirical counterpart of this model is due to Mincer (1974) and specifies wages
as a function of years of formal education. In the neoclassical model firms are
fully utilizing the skills of each worker by changing their production process
to fit the changes in the supply of skilled workers. Thus, the model does not
allow any mismatches. If somehow a person is paid less than the market rate
corresponding to his education, then either the education level does not fully
capture the skill level of the individual or it is a temporary phenomenon as
in Sicherman and Galor (1990) where individuals accept lower paying jobs
initially if the job offers a higher probability of promotion. A third explana-
tion of the existence of mismatches within an efficient equilibrium framework
points out the variations in production processes across sectors with respect
to required skills and heterogeneity in the preferences of workers about jobs
(Gottschalk and Hansen, 2003). The supply of labor of each skill type depends
on the relative wages across sectors for each specific skill and overeducation is
not necessarily a sign of misallocation of resources nor does it mean involuntary
assignment of individuals across sectors.
The other explanations of the incidence of overeducation imply inefficien-
cies in the labor market. The job competition model of Thurow (1975) assumes
that workers are competing for jobs and firms hire them based on the cost of
their training. Since more educated individuals may require lower training,
they are more likely to receive offers and are also more likely to accept some
of these offers even for jobs for which they have more than adequate education
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since they are competing for any employment. The model implies that the spe-
cific nature of the job determines the wage rate rather than the individual’s
characteristics. The Thurow model is in some way related to the screening
model of Spence (1973) in which, due to imperfect information in the labor
market, workers are signalling their ability through acquiring higher levels of
education.
Another plausible explanation for the existence of overeducation is based
on the costs associated with job search (Jovanovic, 1979). In most developing
countries, including Turkey, the number and size of formal institutions that
minimize both the cost of job search and the informational imperfections, such
as employment agencies, are negligible. Most people turn to their friends and
relatives to find a job. If such mechanisms are inefficient, then most jobs will
be filled irrespective of the ability of the worker but rather whom he or she
knows (Mortensen and Vishwanat, 1994). Individuals with lower skills may fill
vacancies that require higher levels of education, and consequently, the skilled
workers crowded out from most positions accept jobs with lower required lev-
els of education. This mechanism may explain not only overeducation but
undereducation as well.
Finally, the assignment models of the labor market emphasize the quality
of matches. The main point of these models is that assigning heterogenous
individuals to different occupations is quite likely to result in mismatches (Sat-
tinger, 1993), and the characteristics of jobs are equally important as the
characteristics of the individuals. Occupations themselves have a productivity
ceiling, therefore some skills of the workers may not be fully utilized. Consid-
ering that many jobs in a developing country require less skills than jobs in an
advanced economy and relative inflexibility in adjustment of production pro-
cesses, the incidence of overeducation and lower returns to surplus education
are more likely outcomes in these economies.
3 Data and methodology
The data used in this study comes from the Household Budget and Expendi-
ture Surveys (HBES) conducted in 1994 and 2002 and cover 26,236 and 9,555
households, respectively, representing Turkish population. In the following
4
analysis only individuals who are employed full-time in a permanent job in
non-agricultural sector are considered. The sample is also restricted to indi-
viduals who are between ages 20 and 64. Since mandatory education has been
increased to eight years in 1997, individuals that are younger than 20 in 2002
will necessarily have a higher level of education. Excluding them abates a
possible bias due to changes in mandatory education law to some extent3.
After all these restrictions there are 11,408 and 4,967 individuals in 1994
and 2002, respectively. The surveys report the highest level of degree earned.
There are six education groups, illiterates, literates without a degree, 5-year
primary school graduates (called ‘junior primary’ in this paper), 8-year pri-
mary school graduates, high school graduates and college and above graduates.
High school and college graduates are assigned 11 and 15 years of education,
respectively. Literate individuals without a degree are assigned only one year
of education4.
The occupation classification in each survey uses different schemes. While
the early survey reported occupations based on the International Standard
Classification of Occupation designed in 1968 (ISCO68), the later uses a re-
cent one, ISCO88. In 1994 two-digit classification of occupations are used.
After merging certain occupations to the closest one due to the limited num-
ber of observation, there are 70 occupations. In 2002, three-digit classifications
of ISCO88 are used and, after merging occupations with too few observations
with the closest category, there are 75 different occupations. While it is pos-
sible to match occupations in different classifications, it can not be done per-
fectly. It is known that ISCO68 is more sensitive to employment status and
industry whereas ISCO88 is more skill oriented. In order not to introduce
additional bias, no attempt has been made to convert one to the other.
There are a few different ways of measuring overeducation. The standard
methods are typically grouped into two, subjective and objective measures of
3Despite the fact that the mandatory education was five years before 1997, there are
many individuals with less education than five years. Apparently, the law has not been
strictly observed in early years.
4In early 1980s the government pushed a campaign to teach basic writing a reading skills
to illiterates by offering one-year courses. Therefore, the assignment of only one year of
schooling to these individuals may be more appropriate
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overeducation. There are two different measures in the former group: The first
one is job analysis where a set of experts decide an optimal level of education
for a specific occupation. The second one is self-assessment where individuals
are asked whether they have an appropriate level of education for their jobs.
The objective measures are based on realized data, and there are basically
two different approaches. The first approach defines a person as over- or un-
dereducated if the acquired level of schooling of that individual is one standard
deviation higher or lower than the mean schooling in that occupation (Verdugo
and Verdugo, 1989). The other approach is closely related and uses the modal
education level to differentiate over- and undereducation from the required
level (Kiker et al., 1997). The meta analysis of Groot and van den Brink
(2000) shows that each provide different estimates for the incidence. Due to
data limitations, the realized data approach is taken here, and for comparison
purposes with each other and previous studies both the standard deviation
and mode methods are employed in the following analysis.
Following the literature, to determine possible causes of over- and undered-
ucation a multinomial logit model is estimated. The specification of the model
is limited with the availability of data. The specification includes gender and
marital status as well as a dummy variable for whether the person reports that
he/she is the head of the household and their interactions. The latter vari-
able is used to test whether there are any evidence for gender-segmented labor
markets. Frank (1978) argues that female employees are more likely to be
overeducated as they are not primary bread-earners and their job opportunity
set is restricted within the location of where their partners work.
The data set also contains various information on the labor market expe-
rience of individuals. The industry and the size of the firm the individual is
employed at, whether the individual is a member of a trade union and whether
he/she is employed by state sector5 are other control variables. Turkey also has
a considerable informal sector. The minimum wage laws and excessive taxa-
tion on labor makes informal employment attractive for both some employers
5Turkey had large State Economic Enterprises that employed a major share of the labor
force. However, starting from mid-1980s most of these firms are been privatized. Still some
existed in the years when the data were collected and I attempt to control for being a state
employee using a dummy variable.
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and employees. To identify informal sector employees a question that asks
whether the person has social security which is required for every employee
by law is used. There is no information on the total labor market experience
of individuals, however, potential experience is calculated as the difference
between individual’s age and completed levels of education minus six years.
Another interesting question about overeducation is whether it has an im-
pact on wages. Following the incidence analysis, a wage equation based on a
standard Mincerian model, however extended by Duncan and Hoffman (1981)
is also estimated. The original Mincerian equation regresses wages on a set of
individual characteristics and on the actual level of education:
ln wi = γaS
a
i +X
′
iβ + i (1)
where X is a vector of control variables, Sai is the actual years of schooling
of individual i, and γa captures returns to an extra year of education. The
extension of Duncan and Hoffman simply decomposes actual education into
three components, required, over- and undereducation:
ln wi = γrS
r
i + γoS
o
i + γuS
u
i +X
′
iβ + i (2)
where Sri is the number of years required to perform the job individual i
is holding, Soi = max(0, S
a
i − Sri ) is the surplus schooling years beyond the
required years that individual attained, and Sui = max(0, S
r
i − Sai ) is the level
of undereducation. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients in front of the
education variables determine whether mismatches in the labor market have
important implications. In the standard Mincerian setting, the requirement
of a job should not determine the wage level, consequently the coefficients of
the second equation should obey the restriction that γr = γo = |γu|. On the
other hand, in Thurow’s job competition model, wages are determined by the
marginal productivity which is fixed for each job, hence independent of the
worker’s assets including human capital. In that case, γo = γu = 0.
In the empirical model the variables to control for individual characteris-
tics are the ones described above, required, overeducation and undereducation
variables are obtained from the incidence analysis. Wages are hourly wages
calculated as monthly salaries adjusted for inflation divided by the product of
4.33 (average number of weeks in a given month) and reported usual hours.
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4 Results
4.1 Incidence
Table 1 provides the estimates for the incidence of over- and undereducation
in Turkey in 1994 and 2002. As reported almost in all studies, the severity of
the incidence of overeducation changes with the way it is measured. In 1994
20% of workers were overeducated, and 16.5% were underestimated using the
modal method. The numbers are much smaller, 13.5% and 9.9%, respectively,
when a standard deviation from the average years is used as thresholds for
required education. In 2002, there are more overeducated and less undered-
ucated workers compared to 1994, regardless of the method used to estimate
incidence. While the demographics of the population change over time and,
moreover, the occupation classification is not the same in both years, one
may argue that there has been a slight increase in the share of overeducated
individuals.
Table 1: Incidence of overeducation and undereducation
Mode Mean
1994 2002 1994 2002
All
Overeducated 20.3 24.6 13.4 15.1
Required ed. 63.2 60.7 76.7 75.3
Undereducated 16.5 14.7 9.9 9.6
Males
Overeducated 21.0 25.3 13.4 14.8
Required ed. 61.9 59.3 77.1 75.1
Undereducated 17.1 15.4 9.6 10.1
Females
Overeducated 17.0 21.4 13.5 16.3
Required ed. 68.9 66.8 74.8 76.5
Undereducated 14.1 11.9 11.7 7.3
There are also significant gender differences in overeducation. Among
women the incidence of both overeducation and undereducation is much lower
than male workers. In the Turkish case, not only are females less overedu-
cated, but the share of women who were undereducated decreases over time
too, apparently contradicting with Frank’s (1978) argument. The interaction
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of two forces could explain this finding. On the one hand, females in Turkey
are less educated despite the fact that average years of schooling of women
has increased almost three times faster than that of males in the last thirty
years; on the other, labor force participation may depend on the availability of
suitable jobs. Instead of accepting jobs with a lower required education, most
women may have chosen not to be part of the labor force. Indeed, Tunali and
Baslevent (2006) report that labor force participation among married women
is very low compared to single females.
The only other study which was not specifically on Turkey but uses data
from Turkey is by Galasi (2008). He, using self-assessment of a small sample
of workers, 252 to be exact, to define overeducation reports that only 1.4% of
Turkish workers think they have appropriate level of education, whereas the
European average is 8%, ranging between 18% and 4%, excluding Turkey. The
share of Turkish workers who think that they are overeducated is 27.4% lower
than the European average of 33%.
In comparison to Mexico (Quinn and Rubb, 2006), Turkey seems to have
less overeducated employees. The other two countries that Quinn and Rubb
(2006) refer to in their study are Hong Kong (Ng, 2001) and Portugal (Kiker
et al., 1997). Compared to the evidence in these countries, the degree of
overeducation in Turkey is similar to the Portuguese case. Similarly, the share
of undereducated workers is much smaller than in Mexico and Hong Kong,
but higher than in Portugal. It should be noted that in terms of per capita
income in international purchasing poverty terms Turkey has been the poorest
country among those mentioned above. Probably the occupation classification
differs across these studies, however, in general it is possible to claim that the
incidence of overeducation shows some variation across different developing
countries.
To test the hypothesis that some people acquire higher levels of education
to compensate for some weaknesses, particularly the lack of experience a set of
multinomial logit models are estimated. Table 2 and Table 3 provide coefficient
estimates for log odds ratios, that is the odds of being over- and undereducated
relative to being adequately educated, in years 1994 and 2002, respectively.
In 1994 there is evidence that overeducation is compensating for the lack of
experience. However, while the coefficients have the expected signs in 2002
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Table 2: Determinats of overeducation, 1994
Mode Mean
Under Over Under Over
Act. Educ -0.2825** 0.3247** -0.5910** 0.4968**
(0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0315) (0.0213)
Female 0.3158 -0.6023** 0.9912** -0.3514
(0.2736) (0.2067) (0.3413) (0.2232)
Hh Head 0.3399 -0.4278** 0.0284 -0.4396*
(0.1905) (0.1481) (0.2489) (0.1740)
Fem. Hh Head -1.0313** -0.4591 -1.1279* -0.3429
(0.3675) (0.4514) (0.4655) (0.5272)
Married==1 -0.4888* 0.4463* -0.4293 0.5953**
(0.2207) (0.1821) (0.2979) (0.2126)
Mar. Fem. 0.0728 -0.1408 -0.2952 -0.0848
(0.3259) (0.2597) (0.4202) (0.2900)
Exper -0.0509** -0.0536** -0.0592* -0.0687**
(0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0288) (0.0263)
Expersq/100 0.1451** 0.0661 0.1580** 0.0628
(0.0325) (0.0446) (0.0457) (0.0623)
Union -0.5257** 0.7003** -0.5564** 0.7693**
(0.1131) (0.1083) (0.1365) (0.1394)
Formal 0.2034 -0.3850** 0.5491** -0.7387**
(0.1431) (0.1434) (0.1819) (0.1862)
State Sector 0.5239** 0.0063 0.6654** 0.1747
(0.1492) (0.1296) (0.1735) (0.1735)
Constant -0.4802 -3.1817** 0.9788 -5.3855**
(0.4168) (0.4004) (0.5274) (0.5261)
Observations 11408 11408
Pseudo-R-sq. 0.2171 0.3442
The model also includes dummies for industry, firm size and twelve regions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** and * denote significance at 1%, and 5% levels.
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Table 3: Determinats of overeducation, 2002
Mode Mean
Under Over Under Over
Act. Educ. -0.2476** 0.2398** -0.4310** 0.5524**
(0.0256) (0.0216) (0.0434) (0.0298)
Female 0.3653 -0.8810** 0.6088 -0.8225**
(0.3164) (0.2121) (0.3622) (0.2762)
Hh Head -0.0271 -0.0642 0.5337 -0.0367
(0.2667) (0.1931) (0.3124) (0.2737)
Fem. Hh Head 0.1031 0.0797 -0.3863 0.3013
(0.7753) (0.4263) (0.8158) (0.5303)
Married 0.1809 -0.0813 0.0286 -0.1077
(0.2833) (0.1927) (0.3436) (0.2890)
Mar. Fem. -0.4991 0.2521 -0.3571 0.3732
(0.4737) (0.3147) (0.5074) (0.3948)
Exper 0.0002 -0.0309 -0.0744 -0.0359
(0.0326) (0.0228) (0.0412) (0.0320)
Expersq/100 0.0162 0.0223 0.1284 -0.0037
(0.0558) (0.0539) (0.0696) (0.0838)
Union 0.1460 0.1994 0.5980* 0.3498
(0.2267) (0.1576) (0.2706) (0.1932)
Formal 0.1116 -0.2259 0.2512 -0.9053**
(0.1672) (0.1420) (0.1999) (0.1952)
State Sector 0.2183 -0.1553 -0.1335 -0.1785
(0.3188) (0.2025) (0.4076) (0.2622)
Constant -0.0628 -3.2747** -0.2115 -6.6065**
(0.7676) (0.5809) (1.1468) (0.7049)
Observations 4967 4967
Pseudo-R-sq. 0.1578 0.2968
The model also includes dummies for industry, firm size and twelve regions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** and * denote significance at 1%, and 5% levels.
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they are not significant. The effect of experience on the probability of being
undereducated is similar to that of being overeducated in both years, negative
and significant in 1994 and insignificant in 2002.
Females are estimated to be less likely to be overeducated than males in
both years, however, there is not a significant relationship between the gender
of the individual and undereducation except in one case. Yet the estimated
coefficients of female households heads in 1994 indicate that they are more
likely to be undereducated, supporting the previous conjecture. Women in
Turkey take part in the labor force only when they have to, and being a female
household head most of the time corresponds to single or widowed females.
The significance of most of the other variables vanishes in 2002. In 1994,
however, married workers were more likely to be overeducated and less likely
to be undereducated. Similarly union membership is closely related to being
over- and undereducated. The formal sector employees are found significantly
more likely to be overeducated rather than having adequate education in both
years. This implies that individuals are trading formal sector employment with
education. Most interestingly, in 1994 being a state sector employee increases
the odds of being undereducated.
4.2 Effects on wages
Tables 4 and 5 provide estimates on how surplus years affect wages in 1994
and 2002, respectively. The first column in each table shows the estimates of
the Mincerian wage equation. There is a significant and considerably high re-
turn on each year of actual education, 9.3% in 1994 and 7.7% in 2002. There
is a slight decline in the return in the later year. The other variables have
expected signs though with different levels of significance. For example the
gender difference disappears in 2002, whereas married individuals turn out to
earn more in the later year. The level of experience has a positive effect on
wages, and the coefficient of squared experience is negative, implying that the
impact of experience is declining. Workers who are members of a trade union
or working in the formal sector or employees of a state owned enterprise earn
significantly higher wages. The magnitude of the coefficients of these vari-
ables can be interpreted showing the importance of institutional framework.
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Particularly, the employees of the state sector earning so much higher wages,
and yet more of them are undereducated can also be interpreted as political
favoritism.
The second and third columns (using mode and mean definitions, respec-
tively) in the tables present the estimates of the extended version of the Mince-
rian equation by Duncan and Hoffmann (1981) where the actual education level
is decomposed into years of required-, over- and undereducation. This version
nests the standard Mincerian equation and tests of whether the surplus years
are significantly different than the required years of education, γr = γo = |γu|,
are provided at the bottom of each table. Similarly, the implication of the
job competition model by Thurow (1975) which implies that only job char-
acteristics determine the wage rate can also be tested imposing the equality
γo = |γu| = 0. Both specifications are rejected in favor of Duncan and Hoff-
mann’s model in the data. Furthermore, the return to a year of required
education is around one percent larger than the return to actual education.
The coefficient estimates of over- and undereducation are significant and
have the expected signs consistently in all specifications. The coefficient of
overeducation is positive and significantly different from the coefficient of re-
quired education and smaller in magnitude. This implies that overeducated
workers are earning more than their colleagues with lower levels of educational
attainment in their jobs yet less than workers with same level of education
who work at adequate jobs. The penalty on overeducation is around 2.9%
per year using the mode definition in 1994 and 3.4% in 2002. The penalty
is higher, 5.5% and 7.5% in the respective years, in the estimation where the
mean method is used. While there is some decline in the returns to required
education, the penalty on overeducation has increased over time.
The differences in the return to required eductation and surplus educa-
tion point out some problems in the assignment of jobs in the labor market.
Considering that per capita income is much lower in Turkey compared to Eu-
ropean countries (in purchasing power terms per capita income in Turkey is
40% of average of 27 members of the European Union) to be able to catch up
with advanced economies requires better allocation of already scarce human
capital.
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Table 4: The effects of overeducation and undereducation on wages, 1994
Mincerian Mode Mean
Act. Educ. 0.0934**
(0.0030)
Overeducation 0.0732** 0.0543**
(0.0059) (0.0042)
Req. Education 0.1017** 0.1087**
(0.0031) (0.0038)
Undereducation -0.0959** -0.1346**
(0.0046) (0.0112)
Female -0.1496** -0.1590** -0.1538**
(0.0408) (0.0410) (0.0424)
Married 0.0619 0.0686* 0.0950**
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0352)
Mar. Fem. 0.0126 0.0137 -0.0095
(0.0498) (0.0499) (0.0514)
Exper 0.0448** 0.0427** 0.0394**
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039)
Expersq/100 -0.0632** -0.0600** -0.0603**
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0074)
Union 0.3501** 0.3672** 0.3413**
(0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0220)
Formal 0.1136** 0.1039** 0.1153**
(0.0326) (0.0329) (0.0338)
State Sector 0.2334** 0.2287** 0.2518**
(0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0262)
Constant 8.8981** 8.8895** 8.8093**
(0.0705) (0.0706) (0.0728)
Observations 11408 11408 11408
R2 0.4582 0.4632 0.4470
F-Test γr = γo = |γu| 13.14 54.33
p-value 0.000 0.000
F-Test γo = |γu| = 0 296.14 161.59
p-value 0.000 0.000
The model also includes dummies for industry, firm size
and twelve regions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 5: The effects of overeducation and undereducation on wages, 2002
Mincerian Mode Mean
Act. Educ. 0.0768**
(0.0046)
Overeducation 0.0549** 0.0318**
(0.0059) (0.0050)
Req. Education 0.0893** 0.1071**
(0.0050) (0.0057)
Undereducation -0.0666** -0.0950**
(0.0075) (0.0151)
Female -0.0198 -0.0551 -0.0461
(0.0556) (0.0566) (0.0541)
Married 0.1541** 0.1421** 0.1681**
(0.0441) (0.0439) (0.0433)
Mar. Fem. -0.0923 -0.0710 -0.0862
(0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0632)
Exper 0.0347** 0.0334** 0.0267**
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0048)
Expersq/100 -0.0482** -0.0468** -0.0390**
(0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Union 0.2334** 0.2423** 0.2353**
(0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303)
Formal 0.3037** 0.2926** 0.2950**
(0.0379) (0.0381) (0.0378)
State Sector 0.3491** 0.3333** 0.3562**
(0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0443)
Constant 13.7079** 13.6575** 13.5398**
(0.1354) (0.1377) (0.1336)
Observations 4964 4964 4964
R2 0.5060 0.5161 0.5128
F-Test γr = γo = |γu| 23.80 65.34
p-value 0.000 0.000
F-Test γo = |γu| = 0 74.90 38.08
p-value 0.000 0.000
The model also includes dummies for industry, firm size
and twelve regions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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5 Conclusion
There is a growing literature on the possible education-occupation mismatches
in developed economies. Some frictions are causing misassignment of workers
to jobs, many individuals are working in jobs that require less education than
they have acquired and are consequently paid less than their counterparts
who work in jobs that match with their educational attainment level. With
the exception of Quinn and Rubb’s (2006) study of the Mexican labor market,
no research exists on whether the same phenomenon is also observed in other
developing countries.
Using data from two different years, this paper examined the incidence of
overeducation in Turkey. The findings show that the share of overeducated
workers in total employment is less in Turkey than Mexico, and at a similar
level as in many developed economies. Thus, there is some evidence that
the experience of developing countries with respect to education-occupation
mismatches is not necessarily similar. Nonetheless, the findings are in line
with most earlier research. Overeducated employees are earning more than
the workers with less educational attainment but significantly less than those
who have the same degree but are working in an adequate job.
These findings are arguably more important in a developing country con-
text because the resources, particularly human capital, is scarce in these
economies. Considering they are lagging advanced economies in terms of per
capita income, efficient use of these limited resources is more important. Two
findings need to be highlighted. First, there is some evidence that education
is compensating for some other characteristics, in this case, the lack of ex-
perience. This is an important issue to be considered by education experts
about the content and means of education. Second, working in the formal
sector or in the state sector makes significant differences both in being over-
/undereducated and in the distribution of wages. The improvements in the
institutional framework can increase the efficiency in the labor market. While
there is no variable to measure the problems that occur in job search in this
paper, recent household labor force surveys in Turkey show that among those
who have found a new job in the last three years, two thirds claim that they
used their own means to find a job and one third indicate that they used
16
friends and relatives. Less than one percent use formal employment agencies
whether public or private.
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